Is Nation-building a PAP Ploy?

This post is from a series prompted from a course on Nation-building in Singapore at the National University of Singapore:

In my coursework I was given a prompt that deserved some thought:

“The ‘imagined’ Singapore nation is an institutional construct that has little basis in history or relevance in an increasingly globalized world. The belated initiatives of the ruling PAP government to inspire a Singaporean nationalism should be seen, not as a reactive response to preserve indigenous identity and culture, but as a rear-guard attempt to insure the government’s ongoing hegemony over the state.”

The two premises of this prompt are (a) that the concept of the Singaporean nation is imagined, without basis in history, or relevance to the future of globalization, and (b), that nationalism is more adeptly understood as a means of the state to maintain sovereignty, rather than an attempt to preserve identity or culture. Though the analysis of nationalism as a vehicle of the government is an interesting take, the picture is incomplete, largely because of a faulty first premise, that the concept of the Singaporean nation is imagined. The struggle to peg down nationalism in all its forms relative to the structure of political society does not support the view that there is no inherent Singaporean nation. Rather, it demonstrates the necessity to focus on nationalism as a function of political society, rather than in the context of political societal structure. Stressing the political culture aspect of nationalism does not preclude nationalism being a vehicle of the government in its ends, but does raise a very critical question: to what extent nationalism can be function of political culture only, or of government policy?

The case for nationalism as a function of political society comes from an understanding first and foremost, that political society is nothing more than a sum of its parts, individuals, their interactions, and the institutions that those interactions constitute. In this structural-functional analytical framework, nationalism only has a place in the framework as a part of political culture. In public policy, the regime can effect nationalist sentiment, and may have motive for one reason or another, but does not plan nationalism any more than it would emerge from political culture only.

Now that the first premise has been deconstructed, and the the “imagined” Singaporean nation is put in the context of a figment of political culture and not a structure of political society, the second premise may be addressed. In the readings, a quote by politician S. Rajaratnam gives strong support to the thesis that regime has in fact motivated nationalist sentiment as early as 1959, before either the merger or independence from Malaysia: “designed to combat the chauvinism of the different ethnic groups in Singapore as part of PAP’s campaign against communal politics.” The same source later describes how Singapore sought to emulate the Israeli Defense Force, as they “had used military service to help create an Israeli identity in their own small country”. From this evidence, it is clear the PAP was motivated to instil nationalist sentiment in Singaporeans, and towards the end of consolidating social cohesion, though this does not prove that any national sentiments were necessarily the consequence of those policies.

Thus, inquiry from this prompt does show that nationalism in the context of Singapore has had more to do with state building rather than the preservation of identity or culture, but does not show that nationalism is a vehicle of the state. Nationalism can be pursued as a policy, but its existence is not dependent on the fact that the PAP willed it.

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